America Secedes from the Empire

1775–1783

These are the times that try men’s souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of their country; but he that stands it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman.

Thomas Paine, December 1776

Bloodshed at Lexington and Concord

in April of 1775 was a clarion call to arms. About twenty thousand musket-bearing “Minute Men” swarmed around Boston, there to coop up the outnum- bered British.

The Second Continental Congress met in Phil adelphia the next month, on May 10, 1775, and this time the full slate of thirteen colonies was represented. The conservative element in Congress was still strong, despite the shooting in Massachusetts. There was still no well-defined sentiment for independence—merely a desire to continue fighting in the hope that the king and Parliament would consent to a redress of griev- ances. Congress hopefully drafted new appeals to the British people and king—appeals that were spurned. Anticipating a possible rebuff, the delegates also adopted measures to raise money and to create an army and a navy. The British and the Americans now teetered on the brink of all-out warfare.

Congress Drafts George Washington

Perhaps the most important single action of the Congress was to select George Washington, one of its members already in an officer’s uniform, to head the hastily improvised army besieging Boston. This choice was made with considerable misgivings. The tall, powerfully built, dignified Virginia planter, then forty-three, had never risen above the rank of a colonel in the militia. His largest command had numbered only twelve hundred men, and that had been some twenty years earlier. Falling short of true military genius, Washington would actually lose more pitched battles than he won.

But the distinguished Virginian was gifted with outstanding powers of leadership and immense strength of character. He radiated patience, courage, self-discipline, and a sense of justice. He was a great moral force rather than a great military mind—a sym bol and a rallying point. People instinctively trusted him; they sensed that when he put himself at the head of a cause, he was prepared, if necessary, to go down with the ship. He insisted on serving without pay, though he kept a careful expense account amounting to more than $100,000. Later he sternly reprimanded his steward at Mount Vernon for providing the enemy, under duress, with supplies. He would have preferred instead to see the enemy put the torch to his mansion.

The Continental Congress, though dimly perceiv ing Washington’s qualities of leadership, chose more wisely than it knew. His selection, in truth, was largely political. Americans in other sections, already jealous, were beginning to distrust the large New England army being collected around Boston. Prudence suggested a commander from Virginia, the largest and most pop ular of the colonies. As a man of wealth, both by inheritance and by marriage, Washington could not be accused of being a fortune-seeker. As an aristocrat, he could be counted on by his peers to check “the excesses of the masses.”
garrisons at Ticonderoga and Crown Point, on the scenic lakes of upper New York. A priceless store of gunpowder and artillery for the siege of Boston was thus secured. In June 1775 the colonists seized a hill, now known as Bunker Hill (actually Breed’s Hill), from which they menaced the enemy in Boston. The British, instead of cutting off the retreat of their foes by flanking them, blundered bloodily when they launched a frontal attack with three thousand men. Sharpshooting Americans, numbering fifteen hundred and strongly entrenched, mowed down the advancing redcoats with frightful slaughter. But the colonists’ scanty store of gunpowder finally gave out, and they were forced to abandon the hill in disorder. With two more such victories, remarked the French foreign minister, the British would have no army left in America.

Even at this late date, in July 1775, the Continental Congress adopted the Olive Branch Petition, professing American loyalty to the crown and begging the king to prevent further hostilities. But following Bunker Hill, King George III slammed the door on all hope of reconciliation. In August 1775 he formally proclaimed the colonies in rebellion; the skirmishes were now out-and-out treason, a hanging crime. The next month he widened the chasm when he sealed arrangements for hiring thousands of German troops to help crush his rebellious subjects. Six German princes involved in the transaction needed the money (one reputedly had seventy-four children); George III needed the men. Because most of these soldiers-for-hire came from the German principality of Hesse, the Americans called all the European mercenaries Hessians.

News of the Hessian deal shocked the colonists. The quarrel, they felt, was within the family. Why bring in outside mercenaries, especially foreigners who had an exaggerated reputation for butchery?

Hessian hirelings proved to be good soldiers in a mechanical sense, but many of them were more interested in booty than in duty. For good reason they were dubbed “Hessian flies.” Seduced by American promises of land, hundreds of them finally deserted and remained in America to become respected citizens.

Bunker Hill and Hessian Hirelings

The clash of arms continued on a strangely contradictory basis. On the one hand, the Americans were emphatically affirming their loyalty to the king and earnestly voicing their desire to patch up difficulties. On the other hand, they were raising armies and shooting down His Majesty’s soldiers. This curious war of inconsistency was fought for fourteen long months—from April 1775 to July 1776—before the fateful plunge into independence was taken.

Gradually the tempo of warfare increased. In May 1775 a tiny American force under Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold surprised and captured the British

The Abortive Conquest of Canada

The unsheathed sword continued to take its toll. In October 1775, on the eve of a cruel winter, the British burned Falmouth (Portland), Maine. In that same autumn, the rebels daringly undertook a two-pronged invasion of Canada. American leaders believed, erroneously, that the conquered French were explosively restive under the British yoke. A successful assault on Canada would add a fourteenth colony, while depriving Britain of a valuable base for striking at the colonies
in revolt. But this large-scale attack, involving some
two thousand American troops, contradicted the claim
of the colonists that they were merely fighting defen-
sively for a redress of grievances. Invasion northward
was undisguised offensive warfare.

This bold stroke for Canada narrowly missed suc-
cess (see Map 8.1). One invading column under the
Irish-born General Richard Montgomery, formerly of
the British army, pushed up the Lake Champlain route
and captured Montréal. He was joined at Québec by the
bedraggled army of General Benedict Arnold, whose
men had been reduced to eating dogs and shoe leather
during their grueling march through the Maine woods.
An assault on Québec, launched on the last day of 1775,
was beaten off. The able Montgomery was killed; the
dashing Arnold was wounded in one leg. Scattered rem-
nants under his command retreated up the St. Lawrence
River, reversing the way Montgomery had come. French
Canadian leaders, who had been generously treated by
the British in the Quebec Act of 1774, showed no real
desire to welcome the plundering anti-Catholic invaders.

Bitter fighting persisted in the colonies, though
most Americans continued to disclaim a desire for
independence. In January 1776 the British set fire
to the Virginia town of Norfolk. In March they were
finally forced to evacuate Boston, taking with them
the leading friends of the king. (Evacuation Day is still
celebrated annually in Boston.) In the South the rebel-
lious colonists won two victories in 1776—one in Feb-
ruary against some fifteen hundred Loyalists at Moore's
Creek Bridge in North Carolina, and the other in June
against an invading British fleet at Charleston harbor.

Thomas Paine Preaches
Common Sense

Why did Americans continue to deny any intention
of independence? Loyalty to the empire was deeply
ingrained; many Americans continued to consider
themselves part of a transatlantic community in which
the mother country of Britain played a leading role;
colonial unity was poor; and open rebellion was dan-
gerous, especially against a formidable Britain. Irish
rebels of that day were customarily hanged, drawn, and
quartered. American rebels might have fared no better.
As late as January 1776—five months before independence was declared—the king’s health was being toasted by the officers of Washington’s mess near Boston. “God save the king” had not yet been replaced by “God save the Congress.”

Gradually the Americans were shocked into recognizing the necessity of separating from the crown. Their eyes were jolted open by harsh British acts like the burning of Falmouth and Norfolk, and especially by the hiring of the Hessians.

Then in 1776 came the publication of *Common Sense*, one of the most influential pamphlets ever written. Its author was the radical Thomas Paine, once an impoverished corset-maker’s apprentice, who had come over from Britain a year earlier. He began his incendiary tract with a treatise on the nature of government and eloquently anticipated Thomas Jefferson’s declaration that the only lawful states were those that derive “their just powers from the consent of the governed.”

As for the king, whom the Americans professed to revere, he was nothing but “the Royal Brute of Great Britain.” *Common Sense* became a whirlwind best seller. Within a few months the astonishing total of 120,000 copies were sold.

Paine flatly branded the shilly-shallying of the colonists as contrary to “common sense.” Nowhere in the physical universe did the smaller heavenly body control the larger one. So why should the tiny island of

---

**MAP 8.1 Revolution in the North, 1775–1776**

Benedict Arnold’s troops were described as “pretty young men” when they sailed from Massachusetts. They were considerably less pretty on their arrival in Québec, after eight weeks of struggling through wet and frigid forests, often without food. “No one can imagine,” one of them wrote, “the sweetness of a roasted shot-pouch [ammunition bag] to the famished appetite.”

© Cengage Learning
In Common Sense Thomas Paine (1737–1809) argued for the superiority of a republic over a monarchy:

“...The nearer any government approaches to a republic the less business there is for a king. It is somewhat difficult to find a proper name for the government of England. Sir William Meredith calls it a republic; but in its present state it is unworthy of the name, because the corrupt influence of the crown, by having all the places in its disposal, hath so effectively swallowed up the power, and eaten out the virtue of the house of commons (the republican part of the constitution) that the government of England is nearly as monarchical as that of France or Spain.”

Britain control the vast continent of America? Paine's pen went a long way toward convincing the American colonists that their true cause was independence rather than reconciliation with Britain—not least because without independence, they could not hope for foreign assistance. Paine could thus be said to have drafted the foundational document not only of American independence, but of American foreign policy as well.

Paine and the Idea of “Republicanism”

Paine's passionate protest was as compelling as it was eloquent and radical—even doubly radical. It called not simply for independence, but for the creation of a new kind of political society, a republic, where power flowed from the people themselves, not from a corrupt and despotic monarch. In language laced with biblical imagery familiar to common folk, he argued that all government officials—governors, senators, and judges—not just representatives in a house of commons, should derive their authority from popular consent.

Paine was hardly the first person to champion a republican form of government. Political philosophers had advanced the idea since the days of classical Greece and Rome. Revived in the Renaissance and in seventeenth-century England, republican ideals had uneasily survived within the British “mixed government,” with its delicate balance of king, nobility, and commons. Republicanism particularly appealed to British politicians critical of excessive power in the hands of the king and his advisors. Their writings found a responsive audience among the American colonists, who interpreted the vengeful royal acts of the previous decade as part of a monarchical conspiracy to strip them of their liberties as British subjects. Paine's radical prescription for the colonies—to reject monarchy and empire and embrace an independent republic—fell on receptive ears.

The colonists' experience with governance had prepared them well for Paine's summons to create a republic. Many settlers, particularly New Englanders, had practiced a kind of republicanism in their democratic town meetings and annual elections, while the popularly elected committees of correspondence during 1774 and 1775 had demonstrated the feasibility of republican government. The absence of a hereditary...
aristocracy and the relative equality of condition enjoyed by landowning farmers meshed well with the republican repudiation of a fixed hierarchy of power.

Most Americans considered citizen “virtue” fundamental to any successful republican government. Because political power no longer rested with the central, all-powerful authority of the king, individuals in a republic needed to sacrifice their personal self-interest to the public good. The collective good of “the people” mattered more than the private rights and interests of individuals. Paine inspired his contemporaries to view America as fertile ground for the cultivation of such civic virtue.

Yet not all Patriots agreed with Paine’s ultra-democratic approach to republicanism. Some favored a republic ruled by a “natural aristocracy” of talent. Republicanism for them meant an end to hereditary aristocracy, but not an end to all social hierarchy. These more conservative republicans feared that the fervor for liberty would overwhelm the stability of the social order. They watched with trepidation as the “lower orders” of society—poorer farmers, tenants, and laboring classes in towns and cities—seemed to embrace a kind of runaway republicanism that amounted to radical “leveling.” The contest to define the nature of American republicanism would noisily continue for at least the next hundred years.

Jefferson’s “Explanation” of Independence

Members of the Philadelphia Congress, instructed by their respective colonies, gradually edged toward a clean break. On June 7, 1776, fiery Richard Henry Lee of Virginia moved that “these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states.” After considerable debate, the motion was adopted nearly a month later, on July 2, 1776.

The passing of Lee’s resolution was the formal “declaration” of independence by the American colonies, and technically this was all that was needed to cut the British tie. John Adams wrote confidently that ever thereafter, July 2 would be celebrated annually with fireworks. But something more was required. An epochal rupture of this kind called for some formal explanation. An inspirational appeal was also needed to enlist other British colonies in the Americas, to invite assistance from foreign nations, and to rally resistance at home.

Shortly after Lee made his memorable motion on June 7, Congress appointed a committee to prepare a more formal statement of separation. The task of drafting it fell to Thomas Jefferson, a tall, freckled, sandy-haired Virginia lawyer of thirty-three. Despite his youth, he was already recognized as a brilliant writer, and he measured up splendidly to the awesome assignment. After some debate and amendment, the Declaration of Independence was formally approved by the Congress on July 4, 1776. It might better have been called “the Explanation of Independence” or, as one contemporary described it, “Mr. Jefferson’s advertisement of Mr. Lee’s resolution.”

Jefferson’s pronouncement, couched in a lofty style, was magnificent. He gave his appeal universality by invoking the “natural rights” of humankind—not just British rights. He argued persuasively that because the king had flouted these rights, the colonists were justified in cutting their connection. He then set forth a long list of the presumably tyrannous misdeeds of George III. The overdrawn bill of indictment included imposing taxes without consent, dispensing with trial by jury, abolishing valued laws, establishing a military dictatorship, maintaining standing armies in peacetime, cutting off trade, burning towns, hiring mercenaries, and inciting hostility among the Indians.*

Jefferson’s withering blast was admittedly one-sided. He acted, in effect, as a prosecuting attorney, and he took certain liberties with historical truth. He was not writing history; he was making it through what has been called “the world’s greatest editorial.” He owned many slaves, and his affirmation that “all men are created equal” was to haunt him and his fellow citizens for generations.

The formal Declaration of Independence cleared the air as a thundershower does on a muggy day. As Paine had predicted, and as events were to prove, foreign assistance could now be solicited with greater hope of success. Those Patriots who defied the king were now rebels, not loving subjects shooting their way into reconciliation. They must all hang together, Franklin is said to have grimly remarked, or they would all hang.

*For an annotated text of the Declaration of Independence, see the Appendix.
In the midst of the revolutionary fervor of 1776, at least one woman—Abigail Adams, wife of noted Massachusetts Patriot (and future president) John Adams—raised her voice on behalf of women. Yet she apparently raised it only in private—in this personal letter to her husband. Private documents like the correspondence and diaries of individuals both prominent and ordinary offer invaluable sources for the historian seeking to discover sentiments, opinions, and perspectives that are often difficult to discern in the official public record. What might it suggest about the historical circumstances of the 1770s that Abigail Adams confined her claim for women’s equality to this confidential exchange with her spouse? What might have inspired the arguments she employed? Despite her privileged position and persuasive power, and despite her threat to “foment a rebellion,” Abigail Adams’s plea went largely unheeded in the Revolutionary era—as did comparable pleadings to extend the revolutionary principle of equality to blacks. What might have accounted for this limited application of the ideas of liberty and equality in the midst of a supposedly democratic revolution?
fought the American rebels (Patriots), while the rebels also fought the British redcoats (see “Makers of America: The Loyalists,” pp. 140–141). Loyalists were derisively called “Tories,” after the dominant political factions in Britain, whereas Patriots were called “Whigs,” after the opposition factions in Britain. A popular definition of a Tory among the Patriots betrayed bitterness: “A Tory is a thing whose head is in England, and its body in America, and its neck ought to be stretched.”

Like many revolutions, the American Revolution was a minority movement. Many colonists were apathetic or neutral, including the Byrds of Virginia, who sat on the fence. The opposing forces contended not only against each other but also for the allegiance and support of the civilian population. In this struggle for the hearts and minds of the people, the British proved fatally inept, and the Patriot militias played a crucial role. The British military proved able to control only those areas where it could maintain a massive military presence. Elsewhere, as soon as the redcoats had marched on, the rebel militiamen appeared and took up the task of “political education”—sometimes by coercive means. Often lacking bayonets but always loaded with political zeal, the ragtag militia units served as remarkably effective agents of Revolutionary ideas. They convinced many colonists, even those indifferent to independence, that the British army was an unreliable friend and that they had better throw in their lot with the Patriot cause. They also mercilessly harassed small British detachments and occupation forces. One British officer ruefully observed that “the Americans would be less dangerous if they had a regular army.”

Loyalists, numbering perhaps 16 percent of the American people, remained true to their king. Families often split over the issue of independence: Benjamin Franklin supported the Patriot side, whereas his handsome illegitimate son, William Franklin (the last royal governor of New Jersey), upheld the Loyalist cause. The Loyalists were tragic figures. For generations the British in the New World had been taught fidelity to the crown. Loyalty is ordinarily regarded as a major virtue—loyalty to one’s family, one’s friends, one’s country. If the king had triumphed, as he seemed likely to do, the Loyalists would have been acclaimed patriots, and defeated rebels like Washington would have been disgraced, severely punished, and probably forgotten.

Many people of education and wealth, of culture and caution, remained loyal. These wary souls were satisfied with their lot and believed that any violent change would only be for the worse. Loyalists were also more numerous among the older generation. Young people make revolutions, and from the outset energetic, purposeful, and militant young people surged forward—figures like the sleeplessly scheming Samuel...

King George III of England (1738–1820), by Johann Zoffany, 1771  America’s last king, he was a good man, unlike some of his scandal-tainted brothers and sons, but a bad king. Doggedly determined to regain arbitrary power for the crown, he antagonized and then lost the thirteen American colonies. During much of his sixty-year reign, he seemed to be insane, but recently medical science has found that he was suffering from a rare metabolic and hereditary disease called porphyria.
In late 1776 Catherine Van Cortlandt wrote to her husband, a New Jersey merchant fighting in a Loyalist brigade, about the Patriot troops who had quartered themselves in her house. “They were the most disorderly of species,” she complained, “and their officers were from the dregs of the people.”

Like the Van Cortlandts, many Loyalists thought of themselves as the “better sort of people.” They viewed their adversaries as “lawless mobs” and “brutes.” Conservative, wealthy, and well educated, Loyalists of this breed thought a break with Britain would invite anarchy. Loyalism made sense to them, too, for practical reasons. Viewing colonial militias as no match for His Majesty’s army, Loyalist pamphleteer Daniel Leonard warned his Patriot enemies in 1775 that “nothing short of a miracle could gain you one battle.”

But Loyalism was hardly confined to the well-to-do. It also appealed to many people of modest means who identified strongly with Britain or who had reason to fear a Patriot victory. Thousands of British veterans of the Seven Years’ War, for example, had settled in the colonies after 1763. Many of them took up farming on two-hundred-acre land grants in New York. They were loath to turn their backs on the crown. So, too, were recent immigrants from non-English regions of the British Isles, especially from Scotland and Ireland, who had settled in Georgia or the backcountry of North and South Carolina. Many of these newcomers, resenting the plantation elite who ran these colonies, filled the ranks of Tory brigades such as the Volunteers of Ireland and the North Carolina Highlanders, organized by the British army to galvanize Loyalist support.

Other ethnic minorities found their own reasons to support the British. Some members of Dutch, German, and French religious sects believed that religious tolerance would be greater under the British than under the Americans, whose prejudices they had already encountered. Though Native American groups had varied responses to the war, many fought on the side of the British, expecting that their treaties with the Empire would protect their land claims.

Thousands of African Americans also joined Loyalist ranks in the hope that service to the British might offer an escape from bondage. British officials encouraged that belief. Throughout the war and in every colony, some African Americans fled to British lines, where they served as soldiers, servants, laborers, and spies. Many of them joined black regiments that specialized in making small sorties against Patriot militias. In Monmouth, New Jersey, the black Loyalist Colonel Tye and his band of raiders became legendary for capturing Patriots and their supplies.

As the war drew to an end in 1783, the fate of black Loyalists varied enormously. Many thousands who came to Loyalism as fugitive slaves managed to find a way to freedom, most notably the large group who won British passage from the port of New York to Nova Scotia. Other African American Loyalists suffered betrayal. British general Lord Charles Cornwallis abandoned over four thousand former slaves in Virginia, and many black Loyalists who...
boarded ships from British-controlled ports expecting to embark for freedom instead found themselves sold back into slavery in the West Indies.

White Loyalists faced no threat of enslavement, but they did suffer travails beyond mere disgrace: arrest, exile, confiscation of property, and loss of legal rights. Faced with such retribution, some eighty thousand Loyalists fled abroad, mostly to Britain and the maritime provinces of Canada, where they became known as the United Empire Loyalists. Some settled contentedly as exiles, but many, especially those who went to Britain, where they had difficulty becoming accepted, lived diminished and lonely lives—“cut off,” as Loyalist Thomas Danforth put it, “from every hope of importance in life . . . [and] in a station much inferior to that of a menial servant.”

But most Loyalists remained in America, where they faced the special burdens of reestablishing themselves in a society that viewed them as traitors. Some succeeded remarkably despite the odds, such as Hugh Gaine, a printer in New York City who eventually reopened a business and even won contracts from the new government. Ironically, this former Loyalist soldier published the new national army regulations authored by the Revolutionary hero Baron von Steuben. Like many former Loyalists, Gaine reintegrated himself into public life by siding with the Federalist call for a strong central government and powerful executive. When New York ratified the Constitution in 1788, Gaine rode the float at the head of the city’s celebration parade. He had, like many other former Loyalists, become an American.
Adams and the impassioned Patrick Henry. His flaming outcry before the Virginia Assembly—“Give me liberty or give me death!”—still quickens patriotic pulses.

Loyalists also included the king’s officers and other beneficiaries of the crown—people who knew which side their daily bread came from. The same was generally true of the Anglican clergy and a large portion of their congregations, all of whom had long been taught submission to the king.

Usually the Loyalists were most numerous where the Anglican Church was strongest. A notable exception was Virginia, where the debt-burdened Anglican aristocrats flocked into the rebel camp. The king’s followers were well entrenched in aristocratic New York City and Charleston, and also in Quaker Pennsylvania and New Jersey, where General Washington felt that he was fighting in “the enemy’s country.” While his men were starving at Valley Forge, nearby Pennsylvania farmers were selling their produce to the British for the king’s gold.

Loyalists were least numerous in New England, where self-government was especially strong and mercantilism was especially weak. Rebels were the most numerous where Presbyterianism and Congregationalism flourished, notably in New England. Invading British armies vented their contempt and anger by using Yankee churches for pigsties.

**The Loyalist Exodus**

Before the Declaration of Independence in 1776, persecution of the Loyalists was relatively mild. Yet they were subjected to some brutality, including tarring and feathering and riding astride fence rails.

After the Declaration of Independence, which sharply separated Loyalists from Patriots, harsher methods prevailed. The rebels naturally desired a united front. Putting loyalty to the colonies first, they regarded their opponents, not themselves, as traitors. Loyalists were roughly handled, hundreds were imprisoned, and a few noncombatants were hanged. But there was no wholesale reign of terror comparable to that which later blooded both France and Russia during their revolutions. For one thing, the colonists reflected Anglo-Saxon regard for order; for another, the leading Loyalists were prudent enough to flee to the British lines.

About eighty thousand loyal supporters of George III were driven out or fled, but several hundred thousand
With Boston evacuated in March 1776, the British concentrated on New York as a base of operations. Here was a splendid seaport, centrally located, where the king could count on cooperation from the numerous Loyalists. An awe-inspiring British fleet appeared off New York in July 1776. It consisted of some five hundred ships and thirty-five thousand men—the largest armed force to be seen in America until the Civil War. General Washington, dangerously outnumbered, could muster only eighteen thousand ill-trained troops with which to meet the crack army of the invader.

![Washington Crossing the Delaware, by Emanuel Gottlieb Leutze, 1851](Image)

On Christmas Day, 1776, George Washington set out from Pennsylvania with twenty-four hundred men to surprise the British forces, chiefly Hessians, in their quarters across the river in New Jersey. The subsequent British defeat proved to be a turning point in the Revolution, as it checked the British advance toward Philadelphia and restored American morale. Seventy-five years later, Leutze, a German American immigrant who had returned to Germany, mythologized the heroic campaign in this painting. Imbued with the liberal democratic principles of the American Revolution, Leutze intended his painting to inspire Europeans in their revolutions of 1848. To that end, he ignored the fact that the Stars and Stripes held by Lieutenant James Monroe was not adopted until 1777; that Washington could not possibly have stood so long on one leg; that the colonists crossed the Delaware at night, not during the day; and that no African American would have been present. What Leutze did capture was the importance of ordinary men in the Revolutionary struggle and the tremendous urgency they felt at this particular moment in 1776, when victory seemed so elusive.

or so of the mild Loyalists were permitted to stay. The estates of many of the fugitives were confiscated and sold—a relatively painless way to help finance the war. Confiscation often worked great hardship, as, for example, when two aristocratic women were forced to live in their former chicken house for leaning Toryward.

Some fifty thousand Loyalist volunteers at one time or another bore arms for the British. They also helped the king’s cause by serving as spies, by inciting the Indians, and by keeping Patriot soldiers at home to protect their families. Ardent Loyalists had their hearts in their cause, and a major blunder of the haughty British was not to make full use of them in the fighting.
Disaster befell the Americans in the summer and fall of 1776. Outgeneraled and outmaneuvered, they were routed at the Battle of Long Island, where panic seized the raw recruits. By the narrowest of margins, and thanks to a favoring wind and fog, Washington escaped to Manhattan Island. Retreating northward, he crossed the Hudson River to New Jersey and finally reached the Delaware River with the British close at his heels. Tauntingly, enemy buglers sounded the fox-hunting call, so familiar to Virginians of Washington’s day. The Patriot cause was at low ebb when the rebel remnants fled across the river after collecting all available boats to forestall pursuit.

The wonder is that Washington’s adversary, General William Howe, did not speedily crush the demoralized American forces. But he was no military genius, and he well remembered the horrible slaughter at Bunker Hill, where he had commanded. The country was rough, supplies were slow in coming, and as a professional soldier, Howe did not relish the rigors of winter campaigning. He evidently found more agreeable the bedtime company of his mistress, the wife of one of his subordinates—a scandal with which American satirists had a good deal of ribald fun.

Washington, who was now almost counted out, stealthily recrossed the ice-clogged Delaware River. At Trenton, on December 26, 1776, he surprised and captured a thousand Hessians who were sleeping off the effects of their Christmas celebration. A week later, leaving his campfires burning as a ruse, he slipped away and inflicted a sharp defeat on a smaller British detachment at Princeton. This brilliant New Jersey campaign, crowned by these two lifesaving victories, revealed “Old Fox” Washington at his military best.

**Burgoyne’s Blundering Invasion**

London officials adopted an intricate scheme for capturing the vital Hudson River valley in 1777. If successful, the British would sever New England from the rest of the states and paralyze the American cause. The main invading force, under an actor-playwright-soldier, General John (“Gentleman Johnny”) Burgoyne, would push down the Lake Champlain route from Canada. General Howe’s troops in New York, if needed, could advance up the Hudson River to meet Burgoyne near Albany. A third and much smaller British force, commanded by Colonel Barry St. Leger, would come in from the west by way of Lake Ontario and the Mohawk Valley.

British planners did not reckon with General Benedict Arnold. After his repulse at Québec in 1775, he had retreated slowly along the St. Lawrence River back to the Lake Champlain area, by heroic efforts keeping an army in the field. The British had pursued his tattered force to Lake Champlain in 1776. But they could not move farther south until they had won control of the lake, which, in the absence of roads, was indispensable for carrying their supplies.

While the British stopped to construct a sizable fleet, the tireless Arnold assembled and fitted out every floatable vessel. His tiny flotilla was finally destroyed after desperate fighting, but time, if not the battle, had been won. Winter was descending, and the British were forced to retire to Canada. General Burgoyne had to start anew from this base the following year. If Arnold had not contributed his daring and skill, the British invaders of 1776 almost certainly would have recaptured Fort Ticonderoga. If Burgoyne had started from this springboard in 1777, instead of from Montréal, he almost certainly would have succeeded in his venture. (At last the apparently futile American invasion of Canada in 1775 was beginning to pay rich dividends.)

General Burgoyne began his fateful invasion with seven thousand regular troops. He was encumbered by a heavy baggage train and a considerable number of women, many of whom were wives of his officers. Progress was painfully slow, for sweaty axmen had to chop a path through the forest, while American militiamen began to gather like hornets on Burgoyne’s flanks.

General Howe, meanwhile, was causing astonished eyebrows to rise. At a time when it seemed obvious that he should be starting up the Hudson River from New York to join his slowly advancing colleague, he deliberately embarked with the main British army for an attack on Philadelphia, the rebel capital. As scholars now know, he wanted to force a general engagement with Washington’s army, destroy it, and leave the path wide-open for Burgoyne’s thrust. Howe apparently assumed that he had ample time to assist Burgoyne directly, should he be needed.
General Washington, keeping a wary eye on the British in New York, hastily transferred his army to the vicinity of Philadelphia. There, late in 1777, he was defeated in two pitched battles, at Brandywine Creek and Germantown. Pleasure-loving General Howe then settled down comfortably in the lively capital, leaving Burgoyne to flounder through the wilds of upper New York. Benjamin Franklin, recently sent to Paris as an envoy, truthfully jested that Howe had not captured Philadelphia but that Philadelphia had captured Howe. Washington finally retired to winter quarters at Valley Forge, a strong, hilly position some twenty miles north-west of Philadelphia. There his frostbitten and hungry men were short of about everything except misery. This rabble was nevertheless whipped into a professional army by the recently arrived Prussian drillmaster, the profane but patient Baron von Steuben.

Burgoyne meanwhile had begun to bog down north of Albany, while a host of American militiamen, scenting the kill, swarmed about him. In a series of sharp engagements, in which General Arnold was again shot in the leg at Quebec, the British army was trapped. Meanwhile, the Americans had driven back St. Leger's force at Oriskany. Unable to advance or retreat, Burgoyne was forced to surrender his entire command at Saratoga on October 17, 1777, to the American general Horatio Gates.

Saratoga ranks high among the decisive battles of both American and world history. The victory immensely revived the faltering colonial cause. Even more important, it made possible the urgently needed foreign aid from France, which in turn helped ensure American independence.

**Revolution in Diplomacy?**

France, thirsting for revenge against Britain, was eager to inflame the quarrel that had broken out in America. Stripped of its North American colonies, Britain would presumably cease to be a front-rank power. France might then regain its former position and prestige, the loss of which in the recent Seven Years' War rankled deeply. For their part, the American revolutionaries badly needed help in the struggle to throw off the British yoke. The stage seemed set for the embattled new nation to make its diplomatic début by sealing an alliance with France against the common British foe.

Yet just as they stood for revolutionary political ideas at home, the rebellious Americans also harbored revolutionary ideas about international affairs. They wanted an end to colonialism and mercantilism. They strongly supported free trade and freedom of the seas. They hoped to substitute the rule of law for the ancient reliance on raw power to arbitrate the affairs of nations. (When the new Republic's great seal proclaimed "a new order for the ages"—novus ordo seculorum in Latin—the sentiment was meant to apply to international as well as domestic affairs.) The Continental Congress in the summer of 1776 had accordingly drafted a Model Treaty to guide the American commissioners it was about to dispatch to the French court. One of the treaty's chief authors, John Adams, described its basic principles: 1. No political connection. . . . 2. No military connection. . . . 3. Only a commercial connection.

For a nascent nation struggling to secure its very existence, these were remarkably self-denying restrictions. Yet they represented an emerging school of thought, popular among enlightened figures in both Europe and America, that deemed history to have reached a momentous turning point when military conflict would be abandoned and the bonds of mutual commercial interest would guarantee peaceful relations among states. Many critics then and later have derided this dream of an imminent golden age as hopelessly naive and impractically utopian; yet it infused an element of idealism into American attitudes toward international affairs that has proved stubbornly persistent.

When wily old Benjamin Franklin arrived in Paris to negotiate the treaty with France, he was determined that his very appearance should herald the diplomatic revolution the Americans hoped to achieve. In his clothing and demeanor, he affected a persona that deliberately violated every norm of diplomatic behavior. Instead of the customary ceremonial sword, he toted only a plain white walking stick. Forsaking ermined robes and fancy wigs, he sported homespun garments and a simple cap of marten fur. "Figure me," he wrote to a friend, "very plainly dress'd, wearing my thin grey strait Hair, that peeps out under my only Coiffure, a fine Fur Cap, which comes down my Forehead almost to my Spectacles. Think how this must appear among the Powder'd Heads of Paris." He shocked the royal court, besotted as it was with pomp.

*After concluding the alliance, France sent a minister to America, to the delight of one Patriot journalist:*

“Who would have thought that the American colonies, imperfectly known in Europe a few years ago and claimed by every pettiflogging lawyer in the House of Commons, every cobbler in the beer-houses of London, as a part of their property, should to-day receive an ambassador from the most powerful monarchy in Europe.”
and protocol. But ordinary Parisians adored him as a specimen of a new democratic social order, devoid of pretense and ornament. When Franklin embraced and kissed the famed French philosopher Voltaire in a Paris theater, the spectators applauded wildly. Meanwhile, the diplomatic game intensified.

After the humiliation at Saratoga in 1777, the British Parliament belatedly passed a measure that in effect offered the Americans home rule within the empire. This was essentially all that the colonials had ever asked for—except independence. If the French were going to break up the British Empire, they would have to bestir themselves. Franklin now played skillfully on French fears of Anglo-American reconciliation. On February 6, 1778, France offered the Americans a treaty of alliance. It did not conform exactly to the terms of the Model Treaty Franklin had brought with him—an early example of practical self-interest trumping abstract idealism in America’s conduct of foreign affairs. Against its better judgment, the young Republic concluded its first entangling military alliance and would soon regret it. But the treaty with France also constituted an official recognition of America’s independence and lent powerful military heft to the Patriot cause. Both allies bound themselves to wage war until the United States had fully secured its freedom and until both agreed to terms with the common enemy. With those pledges, the American Revolutionary War now became a world war.

**The Colonial War Becomes a Wider War**

England and France thus came to blows in 1778, and the shot fired at Lexington rapidly widened into a global conflagration. Spain entered the fray against Britain in 1779, as did Holland. Combined Spanish and French fleets outnumbered those of Britain, and on two occasions the British Isles seemed to be at the mercy of hostile warships.

The weak maritime neutrals of Europe, who had suffered from Britain’s dominance over the seas, now began to demand more respect for their rights (see Table 8.1). In 1780 the imperious Catherine the Great of Russia took the lead in organizing the **Armed Neutrality**, which she later sneeringly called the “Armed Nullity.” It lined up almost all the remaining European neutrals in an attitude of passive hostility toward Britain. The war was now being fought not only in Europe and North America, but also in South America, the Caribbean, and Asia.

To say that America, with some French aid, defeated Britain is like saying “Daddy and I killed the bear.” To Britain, struggling for its very life, the scuffle in the New World became secondary. The Americans deserve credit for having kept the war going until 1778, with secret French aid. But they did not achieve their independence until the conflict erupted into a multipower world war that was too big for Britain to handle. From 1778 to 1783, France provided the rebels with guns, money, immense amounts of equipment, about one-half of America’s regular armed forces, and practically all of the new nation’s naval strength.

France’s entrance into the conflict forced the British to change their basic strategy in America. Hitherto they could count on blocking the colonial coast and commanding the seas. Now the French had powerful fleets in American waters, chiefly to protect their own valuable West Indies islands, but in a position to jeopardize Britain’s blockade and lines of supply. The British, therefore, decided to evacuate Philadelphia and concentrate their strength in New York City.
services were not fully appreciated. He plotted with the British to sell out the key stronghold of West Point, which commanded the Hudson River, for £6,300 and an officer’s commission. By the sheerest accident, the plot was detected in the nick of time, and Arnold fled to the British. “Whom can we trust now?” cried General Washington in anguish.

The British meanwhile had devised a plan to roll up the colonies, beginning with the South, where the Loyalists were numerous (see Map 8.2). The colony of Georgia was ruthlessly overrun in 1778–1779; Charles-
ton, South Carolina, fell in 1780. The surrender of the city to the British involved the capture of five thousand men and four hundred cannon and was a heavier loss to the Americans, in relation to existing strength, than that of Burgoyne was to the British.

Warfare now intensified in the Carolinas, where Patriots bitterly fought their Loyalist neighbors. It was not uncommon for prisoners on both sides to be butchered in cold blood after they had thrown down their arms. The tide turned later in 1780 and early in 1781, when American riflemen wiped out a British detachment at King’s Mountain and then defeated a smaller force at Cowpens. In the Carolina campaign of 1781, General Nathanael Greene, a Quaker-reared tactician, distinguished himself by his strategy of delay. Standing and then retreating, he exhausted his foe, General Charles Cornwallis, in vain pursuit. By losing battles but winning campaigns, the “Fighting Quaker” finally succeeded in clearing most of Georgia and South Carolina of British troops.

In June 1778 the withdrawing redcoats were attacked by General Washington at Monmouth, New Jersey, on a blisteringly hot day. Scores of men collapsed or died from sunstroke. But the battle was indecisive, and the British escaped to New York, although about one-third of their Hessians deserted. Henceforth, except for the Yorktown interlude of 1781, Washington remained in the New York area hemming in the British.

 Blow and Counterblow

In the summer of 1780, a powerful French army of six thousand regular troops, commanded by the Comte de Rochambeau, arrived in Newport, Rhode Island. The Americans were somewhat suspicious of their former enemies; in fact, several ugly flare-ups, involving minor bloodshed, had already occurred between the new allies. But French gold and goodwill melted hard hearts. Dancing parties were arranged with the prim Puritan maidens; one French officer related, doubtless with exaggeration, “The simple innocence of the Garden of Eden prevailed.” No real military advantage came immediately from this French reinforcement, although preparations were made for a Franco-American attack on New York.

Improving American morale was staggered later in 1780, when General Benedict Arnold turned traitor. A leader of undoubted dash and brilliance, he was ambitious, greedy, unscrupulous, and suffering from a well-grounded but petulant feeling that his valuable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 8.1 Britain Against the World</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Britain and Allies</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Loyalists and Indians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,000 hired Hessians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(Total population on Britain’s side: ca. 8 million)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belligerents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(Total population: ca. 39.5 million)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members of the Armed Neutrality (with dates of joining)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia, 1780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark-Norway, 1780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden, 1780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holy Roman Empire, 1781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prussia, 1782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal, 1782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Sicilies, 1783 (after peace signed)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Service was not fully appreciated. He plotted with the British to sell out the key stronghold of West Point, which commanded the Hudson River, for £6,300 and an officer’s commission. By the sheerest accident, the plot was detected in the nick of time, and Arnold fled to the British. “Whom can we trust now?” cried General Washington in anguish.

The British meanwhile had devised a plan to roll up the colonies, beginning with the South, where the Loyalists were numerous (see Map 8.2). The colony of Georgia was ruthlessly overrun in 1778–1779; Charleston, South Carolina, fell in 1780. The surrender of the city to the British involved the capture of five thousand men and four hundred cannon and was a heavier loss to the Americans, in relation to existing strength, than that of Burgoyne was to the British.

Warfare now intensified in the Carolinas, where Patriots bitterly fought their Loyalist neighbors. It was not uncommon for prisoners on both sides to be butchered in cold blood after they had thrown down their arms. The tide turned later in 1780 and early in 1781, when American riflemen wiped out a British detachment at King’s Mountain and then defeated a smaller force at Cowpens. In the Carolina campaign of 1781, General Nathanael Greene, a Quaker-reared tactician, distinguished himself by his strategy of delay. Standing and then retreating, he exhausted his foe, General Charles Cornwallis, in vain pursuit. By losing battles but winning campaigns, the “Fighting Quaker” finally succeeded in clearing most of Georgia and South Carolina of British troops.

In June 1778 the withdrawing redcoats were attacked by General Washington at Monmouth, New Jersey, on a blisteringly hot day. Scores of men collapsed or died from sunstroke. But the battle was indecisive, and the British escaped to New York, although about one-third of their Hessians deserted. Henceforth, except for the Yorktown interlude of 1781, Washington remained in the New York area hemming in the British.

**Blow and Counterblow**

In the summer of 1780, a powerful French army of six thousand regular troops, commanded by the Comte de Rochambeau, arrived in Newport, Rhode Island. The Americans were somewhat suspicious of their former enemies; in fact, several ugly flare-ups, involving minor bloodshed, had already occurred between the new allies. But French gold and goodwill melted hard hearts. Dancing parties were arranged with the prim Puritan maidens; one French officer related, doubtless with exaggeration, “The simple innocence of the Garden of Eden prevailed.” No real military advantage came immediately from this French reinforcement, although preparations were made for a Franco-American attack on New York.

Improving American morale was staggered later in 1780, when General Benedict Arnold turned traitor. A leader of undoubted dash and brilliance, he was ambitious, greedy, unscrupulous, and suffering from a well-grounded but petulant feeling that his valuable services were not fully appreciated. He plotted with the British to sell out the key stronghold of West Point, which commanded the Hudson River, for £6,300 and an officer’s commission. By the sheerest accident, the plot was detected in the nick of time, and Arnold fled to the British. “Whom can we trust now?” cried General Washington in anguish.

The British meanwhile had devised a plan to roll up the colonies, beginning with the South, where the Loyalists were numerous (see Map 8.2). The colony of Georgia was ruthlessly overrun in 1778–1779; Charleston, South Carolina, fell in 1780. The surrender of the city to the British involved the capture of five thousand men and four hundred cannon and was a heavier loss to the Americans, in relation to existing strength, than that of Burgoyne was to the British.

Warfare now intensified in the Carolinas, where Patriots bitterly fought their Loyalist neighbors. It was not uncommon for prisoners on both sides to be butchered in cold blood after they had thrown down their arms. The tide turned later in 1780 and early in 1781, when American riflemen wiped out a British detachment at King’s Mountain and then defeated a smaller force at Cowpens. In the Carolina campaign of 1781, General Nathanael Greene, a Quaker-reared tactician, distinguished himself by his strategy of delay. Standing and then retreating, he exhausted his foe, General Charles Cornwallis, in vain pursuit. By losing battles but winning campaigns, the “Fighting Quaker” finally succeeded in clearing most of Georgia and South Carolina of British troops.
The West was ablaze during much of the war. Indian allies of George III, hoping to protect their land, were busy with torch and tomahawk; they were egged on by British agents branded as “hair buyers” because they paid bounties for American scalps. Fateful 1777 was known as “the bloody year” on the frontier. Although two nations of the Iroquois Confederacy, the Oneidas and the Tuscaroras, sided with the Americans, the Senecas, Mohawks, Cayugas, and Onondagas joined the British. They were urged on by Mohawk chief Joseph Brant, a convert to Anglicanism who believed, not without reason, that a victorious Britain would restrain American expansion into the West. Brant and the British ravaged large areas of backcountry Pennsylvania and New York until checked by an American force in 1779. In 1784 the pro-British Iroquois were forced to
Setting the Stage for Victory

149

Ships, commanded by daring officers, the most famous of whom was a hard-fighting young Scotsman, John Paul Jones. As events turned out, this tiny naval force never made a real dent in Britain’s thunderous fleets. Its chief contribution was in destroying British merchant shipping and thus carrying the war into the waters around the British Isles.

More numerous and damaging than ships of the regular American navy were swift privateers. These craft were privately owned armed ships—legalized pirates in a sense—specifically authorized by Congress to prey on enemy shipping. Altogether over a thousand American privateers, responding to the call of patriotism and profit, sallied forth with about seventy thousand men (“sailors of fortune”). They captured some six hundred British prizes, while British warships captured about as many American merchantmen and privateers.

Privateering was not an unalloyed asset. It had the unfortunate effect of diverting manpower from the main war effort and involving Americans, including Benedict Arnold, in speculation and graft. But the privateers brought in urgently needed gold, harassed the

sign the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, the first treaty between the United States and an Indian nation. Under its terms the Indians ceded most of their land.

Yet even in wartime, the human tide of westward-moving pioneers did not halt its flow. Eloquent testimony is provided by place names in Kentucky, such as Lexington (named after the battle) and Louisville (named after America’s new ally, Louis XVI).

In the wild Illinois country, the British were especially vulnerable to attack, for they held only scattered posts that they had captured from the French. An audacious frontiersman, George Rogers Clark, conceived the idea of seizing these forts by surprise. In 1778–1779 he floated down the Ohio River with about 175 men and captured in quick succession the forts Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and Vincennes (see Map 8.3). Clark’s admirers have argued, without positive proof, that his success forced the British to cede the region north of the Ohio River to the United States at the peace table in Paris.

America’s infant navy had meanwhile been laying the foundations of a brilliant tradition. The naval establishment consisted of only a handful of nondescript

Baron von Steuben (1730–1794), a Prussian general who helped train the Continental Army, found the Americans to be very different from other soldiers he had known. As von Steuben explained to a fellow European,

“‘The genius of this nation is not in the least to be compared with that of the Prussians, Austrians, or French. You say to your soldier, ‘Do this’ and he doeth it; but I am obliged to say, ‘This is the reason why you ought to do that,’ and then he does it.”
enemy, and raised American morale by providing victories at a time when victories were few. British shipping was so badly riddled by privateers and by the regular American navy that insurance rates skyrocketed. Merchant ships were compelled to sail in convoy, and British shippers and manufacturers brought increasing pressure on Parliament to end the war on honorable terms.

**Yorktown and the Final Curtain**

One of the darkest periods of the war was 1780–1781, before the last decisive victory. Inflation of the currency continued at full gallop. The government, virtually bankrupt, declared that it would repay many of its debts at the rate of only 2.5 cents on the dollar. Despair prevailed, the sense of unity withered, and mutinous sentiments infected the army.

Meanwhile, the British general Cornwallis was blundering into a trap. After futile operations in Virginia, he had fallen back to Chesapeake Bay at **Yorktown** to await seaborne supplies and reinforcements. He assumed Britain would continue to control the sea. But these few fateful weeks happened to be one of the brief periods during the war when British naval superiority slipped away.

The French were now prepared to cooperate energetically in a brilliant stroke. Admiral de Grasse, operating with a powerful fleet in the West Indies, advised the Americans that he was free to join with them in an assault on Cornwallis at Yorktown. Quick to seize this opportunity, General Washington made a swift march of more than three hundred miles to the Chesapeake from the New York area. Accompanied by Rochambeau’s French army, Washington beset the British by land, while de Grasse blockaded them by sea after beating off the British fleet. Completely cornered, Cornwallis surrendered his entire force of seven thousand men on October 19, 1781, as his band appropriately played “The World Turn’d Upside Down.” The triumph was no less French than American: the French provided essentially all the sea power and about half of the regular troops in the besieging army of some sixteen thousand men.

Stunned by news of the disaster, Prime Minister Lord North cried, “Oh God! It’s all over! It’s all over!” But it was not. George III stubbornly planned to continue the struggle, for Britain was far from being crushed. It still had fifty-four thousand troops in North America,
including thirty-two thousand in the United States. Washington returned with his army to New York, there to continue keeping a vigilant eye on the British force of ten thousand men.

Fighting actually continued for more than a year after Yorktown, with Patriot–Loyalist warfare in the South especially savage. “No quarter for Tories” was the common battle cry. One of Washington’s most valuable contributions was to keep the languishing cause alive, the army in the field, and the states together during these critical months. Otherwise a satisfactory peace treaty might never have been signed.

**Peace at Paris**

After Yorktown, despite George III’s obstinate eagerness to continue fighting, many Britons were weary of war and increasingly ready to come to terms. They had suffered heavy reverses in India and in the West Indies. The island of Minorca in the Mediterranean had fallen; the Rock of Gibraltar was tottering. Lord North’s ministry collapsed in March 1782, temporarily ending the personal rule of George III. A Whig ministry, rather favorable to the Americans, replaced the Tory regime of Lord North.

Three American peace negotiators had meanwhile gathered at Paris: the aging but astute Benjamin Franklin; the flinty John Adams, vigilant for New England interests; and the impulsive John Jay of New York, deeply suspicious of Old World intrigue. The three envoys had explicit instructions from Congress to make no separate peace and to consult with their French allies at all stages of the negotiations. But the American representatives chafed under this directive. They well knew that it had been written by a subservient Congress, with the French Foreign Office indirectly guiding the pen.

France was in a painful position. It had induced Spain to enter the war on its side, in part by promising to deliver British-held Gibraltar. Yet the towering rock was defying frantic joint assaults by French and Spanish troops. Spain also coveted the immense trans-Allegheny area, on which restless American pioneers were already settling.

**Blundering George III, a poor loser, wrote this of America:**

“Knavery seems to be so much the striking feature of its inhabitants that it may not in the end be an evil that they become aliens to this Kingdom”

*In 1800 the Prussian statesman Friedrich von Gentz (1764–1832) published an essay titled “Origins and Principles of the American Revolution, Compared with the French.” In it he argued that*

“the Americans escaped the most dangerous of all the rocks, which in our times threatens the founders of any revolution: the deadly passion for making political experiments with abstract theories and untried systems.”

John Quincy Adams (1767–1848) translated von Gentz’s work into English, because, he said,

“it rescues [the American] revolution from the disgraceful imputation of having proceeded from the same principles as the French.”

France, ever eager to smash Britain’s empire, desired an independent United States, but one independent in the abstract, not in action. It therefore schemed to keep the new Republic cooped up east of the Allegheny Mountains. A weak America—like a horse sturdy enough to plow but not vigorous enough to kick—would be easier to manage in promoting French interests and policy. France was paying a heavy price in men and treasure to win America’s independence, and it wanted to get its money’s worth.

But John Jay was unwilling to play France’s game. Suspiciously alert, he perceived that the French could not satisfy the conflicting ambitions of both Americans and Spaniards. He saw signs—or thought he did—indicating that the Paris Foreign Office was about to betray America’s trans-Appalachian interests to satisfy those of Spain. He therefore secretly made separate overtures to London, contrary to his instructions from Congress. The hard-pressed British, eager to entice one of their enemies from the alliance, speedily came to terms with the Americans. A preliminary treaty of peace was signed in 1782; the final peace, the next year.

By the **Treaty of Paris** of 1783, the British formally recognized the independence of the United States. In addition, they granted generous boundaries, stretching majestically to the Mississippi on the west, to the Great Lakes on the north, and to Spanish Florida on the south. (Spain had recently captured Florida from Britain.) The Yankees, though now divorced from the empire, were to retain a share in the priceless fisheries of Newfoundland. The Canadians, of course, were profoundly displeased.

The Americans, on their part, had to yield important concessions. Loyalists were not to be further
persecuted, and Congress was to recommend to the state legislatures that confiscated Loyalist property be restored. As for the debts long owed to British creditors, the states vowed to put no lawful obstacles in the way of their collection. Unhappily for future harmony, the assurances regarding both Loyalists and debts were not carried out in the manner hoped for by London.

As for Britain, its acceptance of defeat in North America eventually paid enormous strategic dividends. Persisting in the colonial conflict might well have bled Britain dry. But shutting down the war against the Americans enabled London to rebuild its army and navy and eventually prevail in its titanic struggle with Napoleon—and to become the preeminent world power in the nineteenth century.

**A New Nation Legitimized**

Britain’s terms were liberal almost beyond belief. The enormous trans-Appalachian area was thrown in as a virtual gift, for George Rogers Clark had captured only a small segment of it. Why the generosity? Had the United States beaten Britain to its knees?

The key to the riddle may be found in the Old World. At the time the peace terms were drafted, Britain was trying to seduce America from its French alliance, so it made the terms as alluring as possible. The shaky Whig ministry, hanging on by its fingernails for only a few months, was more friendly to the Americans than were the Tories. It was determined, by a policy of liberality, to salve recent wounds, reopen old trade channels, and prevent future wars over the coveted trans-Appalachian region. This farsighted policy was regrettably not followed by the successors of the Whigs.

In spirit, the Americans made a separate peace—contrary to the French alliance. In fact, they did not. The Paris Foreign Office formally approved the terms of peace, though disturbed by the lone-wolf course of its American ally. France was immensely relieved by the prospect of bringing the costly conflict to an end and of freeing itself from its embarrassing promises to the Spanish crown.

The Reconciliation Between Britannia and Her Daughter America (detail) America (represented by an Indian) is invited to buss (kiss) her mother. Compare this cartoon with the one on p. 114. Miriam and Ira D. Wallach Division of Art, Prints and Photographs, The New York Public Library. Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations.

America alone gained from the world-girdling war. The British, though soon to stage a comeback, were battered and beaten. The French savored sweet revenge but plunged headlong down the slippery slope to bankruptcy and revolution. The Americans fared much better. Snatching their independence from the furnace of world conflict, they began their national career with a splendid territorial birthright and a priceless heritage of freedom. Seldom, if ever, have any people been so favored.

**Varying Viewpoints**

**Whose Revolution?**

Historians once assumed that the Revolution was just another chapter in the unfolding story of human liberty—an important way station on a divinely ordained pathway toward moral perfection in human affairs. This approach, often labeled the "Whig view of history," was best expressed in George Bancroft’s ten-volume History of the United States of America, published between the 1830s and 1870s.
By the end of the nineteenth century, a group of historians known as the “imperial school” challenged Bancroft, arguing that the Revolution was best understood not as the fulfillment of national destiny, but as a constitutional conflict within the British Empire. For historians like George Beer, Charles Andrews, and Lawrence Gipson, the Revolution was the product of a collision between two different views of empire. While the Americans were moving steadily toward more self-government, Britain increasingly tightened its grip, threatening a stranglehold that eventually led to wrenching revolution.

By the early twentieth century, these approaches were challenged by the so-called progressive historians, who argued that neither divine destiny nor constitutional quibbles had much to do with the Revolution. Rather, the Revolution stemmed from deep-seated class tensions within American society. Once released by revolt, those tensions produced a truly transformed social order. Living themselves in a reform age when entrenched economic interests cowered under heavy attack, progressive historians like Carl Becker insisted that the Revolution was not just about “home rule” within the British Empire, but also about “who should rule at home” in America, the upper or lower classes. J. Franklin Jameson took Becker’s analysis one step further in his influential The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement (1926). He claimed that the Revolution not only grew out of intense struggles between social groups, but also inspired many ordinary Americans to seek greater economic and political power, fundamentally democratizing society in its wake.

In the 1950s the progressive historians fell out of favor as the political climate became more conservative. Interpretations of the American Revolution as a class struggle did not play well in a country obsessed with the spread of communism, and in its place arose the so-called consensus view. Historians such as Robert Brown and Edmund Morgan downplayed the role of class conflict in the Revolutionary era, but emphasized that colonists of all ranks shared a commitment to certain fundamental political principles of self-government. The unifying power of ideas was now back in fashion almost a hundred years after Bancroft.

Since the 1950s two broad interpretations have contended with each other and perpetuated the controversy over whether political ideals or economic and social realities were most responsible for the Revolution. The first, articulated most prominently by Bernard Bailyn, has emphasized ideological and psychological factors. Focusing on the power of ideas to foment revolution, Bailyn argued that the colonists, incited by their reading of seventeenth-century and early-eighteenth-century English political theorists, grew extraordinarily (perhaps even exaggeratedly) suspicious of any attempts to tighten the imperial reins on the colonies. When confronted with new taxes and commercial regulations, these hypersensitive colonists screamed “conspiracy against liberty” and “corrupt ministerial plot.” In time they took up armed insurrection in defense of their intellectual commitment to liberty.

A second school of historians, inspired by the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, revived the progressive interpretation of the Revolution. Gary Nash, in The Urban Crucible (1979), and Edward Countryman, in A People in Revolution (1981), pointed to the increasing social and economic divisions among Americans in both the urban seaports and the isolated countryside in the years leading up to the Revolution. Attacks by laborers on political elites and expressions of resentment toward wealth were taken as evidence of a society that was breeding revolutionary change from within, quite aside from British provocations. Some of these arguments have continued into more recent scholarship; Woody Holton, in Forced Founders (1999), argues that pressures exerted by the presence of Indians, slaves, and poor whites forced the Virginia elite onto the road toward independence.

While the concerns of the progressive historians echo in these socioeconomic interpretations of the Revolution, the neoprogressives have been more careful not to reduce the issues simplistically to the one-ring arena of economic self-interest. Instead, they have argued that the varying material circumstances of American participants led them to hold distinctive versions of republicanism, giving the Revolution a less unified and more complex ideological underpinning than the idealistic historians had previously suggested. The dialogue between proponents of “ideas” and “interests” has gradually led to a more nuanced meeting of the two views.

In another recent trend, scholars have taken a more transatlantic view of the Revolution’s origins, asking when and how colonists shifted from identifying as “British” to viewing themselves as “American.” Fred Anderson has argued that long before rebellion, the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) helped create a sense of American identity apart from Britain. Still other historians, such as T. H. Breen, argue that British nationalism actually intensified in the colonies over the course of the eighteenth century, as economic and cultural ties between Britain and North America strengthened through increased trade and the migration of ideas with the growth of print culture. Only when colonists realized that the British did not see them as equal imperial citizens, entitled to the same rights as Englishmen, did American nationalism emerge and Americans rebel. Taking a broader global view, David Armitage has argued that the American Declaration of Independence had an impact far beyond the British Atlantic world, shaping rhetoric of countries claiming their independence into the following century and beyond.
Chapter Review

KEY TERMS

Second Continental Congress (132)
Bunker Hill, Battle of (133)
Olive Branch Petition (133)
Hessians (133)
Common Sense (135)
Declaration of Independence (137)
Declaration of the Rights of Man (139)
Loyalists (139)

Patriots (139)
Long Island, Battle of (144)
Trenton, Battle of (144)
Saratoga, Battle of (145)
Model Treaty (145)
Armed Neutrality (146)
Fort Stanwix, Treaty of (149)
privateers (149)
Yorktown, Battle of (150)
Paris, Treaty of (151)

PEOPLE TO KNOW

Ethan Allen
Benedict Arnold
Richard Montgomery
Thomas Paine
Abigail Adams
Richard Henry Lee
Lord Charles Cornwallis
William Howe

John (“Gentleman Johnny”) Burgoyne
Benjamin Franklin
Comte de Rochambeau
Nathanael Greene
Joseph Brant
George Rogers Clark
Admiral de Grasse

CHRONOLOGY

1775
Battles of Lexington and Concord
Second Continental Congress
Americans capture British garrisons at Ticonderoga and Crown Point
Battle of Bunker Hill
King George III formally proclaims colonies in rebellion
Failed invasion of Canada

1776
Paine’s Common Sense
Declaration of Independence
Battle of Trenton

1777
Battle of Brandywine
Battle of Germantown
Battle of Saratoga

1778
Formation of French-American alliance
Battle of Monmouth

1778–1779
Clark’s victories in the West

1781
Battle of King’s Mountain
Battle of Cowpens
Greene leads Carolina campaign
French and Americans force Cornwallis to surrender at Yorktown

1782
North’s ministry collapses in Britain

1783
Treaty of Paris

1784
Treaty of Fort Stanwix
TO LEARN MORE


A complete, annotated bibliography for this chapter—along with brief descriptions of the People to Know—may be found on the American Pageant website. The Key Terms are defined in a Glossary at the end of the text.
AP* Review Questions for Chapter 8

1. What was the principal reason that the Second Continental Congress selected George Washington to head the army in 1775?
   (A) They valued his leadership abilities.
   (B) He had an impressive military track record.
   (C) They wanted to squelch tensions between the colonies.
   (D) He was willing to serve without pay.
   (E) He was an aristocrat.

2. The Olive Branch Petition was
   (A) England's attempt to end the war with the colonies.
   (B) England's contract to hire German soldiers—called Hessians by Americans—to halt the colonial rebellion.
   (C) a last-ditch effort by the Continental Congress to urge King George to end the hostilities.
   (D) German soldiers shifting sympathies from the British to the Americans.
   (E) an agreement between England and Native Americans that the latter would remain neutral.

3. Why did the colonial army invade and seek to conquer Canada in late 1775?
   (A) They thought the British soldiers were most vulnerable there.
   (B) They hoped to add it as a fourteenth colony.
   (C) They wanted to establish Canada as a military base of operations.
   (D) They hoped to secure France's support for the colonial cause.
   (E) They wanted to eliminate the Roman Catholic regime there.

4. Even as they engaged in battles in 1775 and 1776, Americans continued to resist total independence from England for all of the following reasons EXCEPT that
   (A) their loyalty to England was deeply ingrained.
   (B) they enjoyed their status as part of a transatlantic community in which Britain was a leader.
   (C) there was little colonial unity.
   (D) they feared repercussions from Great Britain.
   (E) they needed British protection from other potential invading nations.

5. Who was the first person to propose that the colonies become completely independent of England?
   (A) Thomas Jefferson
   (B) Samuel Adams
   (C) Thomas Paine
   (D) John Adams
   (E) George Washington

6. In republican governments
   (A) power flows from the people.
   (B) monarchy, aristocracy, and commons share power equally.
   (C) all people are considered equal.
   (D) self-interest can be marshaled for the greater good.
   (E) authority resides exclusively with the king.

7. What is meant by “a natural aristocracy of talent”?
   (A) That only men of noble birth should lead
   (B) That only the best-educated and socially situated men were qualified to lead
   (C) That anyone could get ahead through hard work
   (D) That the good of the majority mattered above the welfare of individuals
   (E) That republican forms of government should replace monarchies

8. In the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson listed all of the following as reasons for severing ties with England EXCEPT
   (A) imposing taxes without consent.
   (B) eliminating trial by jury.
   (C) establishing a military dictatorship.
   (D) granting religious tolerance to Roman Catholics and others.
   (E) cutting off trade.

9. Which of the following could NOT be said about Loyalists, who did not want to break from England?
   (A) They were wealthy elites who considered Patriots to be lawless brutes.
   (B) They believed no army could surpass the might of the British military.
   (C) Some were British veterans of the Seven Years' War who relocated to America.
   (D) They included new immigrants who resented the plantation elite.
   (E) A large majority were African American current and former slaves.
10. In terms of supporting the Revolution, most colonists were initially
   (A) Patriots.
   (B) neutral.
   (C) Loyalists.
   (D) militia volunteers.
   (E) fearful.

11. What is the military significance of Washington crossing the Delaware on Christmas Day in 1776 and later surprising the Hessians at Trenton and Princeton, New Jersey?
   (A) It was the Patriots’ first victory.
   (B) He was able to pick up new recruits and expand his army there.
   (C) The victories proved life-saving to the colonists’ cause.
   (D) It led to the capture of British General Howe.
   (E) It enabled the Patriots to keep New England from being attacked and isolated by the British.

12. The Battle of Saratoga proved vitally important to the American cause because
   (A) it encouraged France to provide much-needed military aid.
   (B) the impressive British general Burgoyne perished in combat.
   (C) Britain surrendered, and the Revolution was won.
   (D) it boosted the morale of the Patriots.
   (E) it brought France, Spain, and Germany into the conflict on the side of the Americans.

13. Which of the following was NOT among America’s goals for revolutionizing international affairs after its battle for independence?
   (A) Ending colonialism
   (B) Ending mercantilism
   (C) Promoting free trade
   (D) Instituting freedom of the seas
   (E) Forging military alliances

14. The Treaty of Fort Stanwix was
   (A) the first treaty between the United States and an Indian nation.
   (B) the peace treaty that ended the Revolution and created an independent United States.
   (C) an agreement between the British and four Iroquois nations in which they joined forces against the American revolutionaries.
   (D) a deal between France and Spain, in which the latter would gain Gibraltar should England lose.
   (E) the agreement negotiated by Benjamin Franklin that brought France into the Revolution on the side of the Americans.

15. Why have women’s rights activists historically regarded Abigail Adams as a heroine when there was no full-fledged women’s movement in America until the 1840s?
   (A) She was one of a few women to play a role in the Revolutionary War.
   (B) She urged her prominent husband, John Adams, to consider women’s rights in the development of independent America.
   (C) She was outspoken in her fight for women’s rights despite the lack of a movement.
   (D) She personally appealed to the Second Continental Congress to include women in the Declaration of Independence.
   (E) She symbolized equal partnership in marriage and fought for the right to vote.

16. The Revolutionary War became a global conflagration because all of the following countries played a role EXCEPT
   (A) France.
   (B) Spain.
   (C) Denmark-Norway.
   (D) Russia.
   (E) Poland.