SAQ
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
a) Briefly explain ONE major difference between Alperovitz and Sherwin’s historical interpretation of the dropping of the atomic bombs.
A major difference lies in the intent behind the decision. Alperovitz interprets the use of the bomb as a calculated political move aimed at the Soviet Union, arguing that it was a "combat demonstration" intended to force the Russians to accept American terms for peace rather than a decision based on military necessity. Sherwin, however, views the decision as being driven by internal momentum and "unquestioned assumptions." He argues that the secret development of the weapon created a "logic of its own," making the bomb appear as a "total solution" that policymakers felt compelled to use because they were trapped by the project's own trajectory.
b) Briefly explain how ONE development from 1941 to 1945 not directly mentioned in the excerpts challenges Alperovitz’s argument.
The extremely high casualty rates during the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa in 1945 challenge Alperovitz’s argument that military considerations were not the overriding factor. The fierce resistance shown by Japanese forces in these battles led many American military planners to believe that a land invasion of Japan would result in a massive loss of American lives. This suggests that the decision to use the bomb was deeply rooted in the military necessity of ending the war quickly to avoid an even bloodier invasion, rather than being primarily a diplomatic tool against Russia.
c) Briefly explain how ONE development from 1941 to 1945 not directly mentioned in the excerpt's challenges Sherwin’s argument.
Sherwin’s claim that policymakers were "trapped" by "unquestioned assumptions" is challenged by the deliberations of the Interim Committee and the Franck Report. In June 1945, scientists involved in the Manhattan Project issued the Franck Report, which specifically argued against using the bomb on a city and instead suggested a technical demonstration. The fact that these alternatives were formally proposed and discussed by high-level officials indicates that assumptions were indeed questioned and that the decision to drop the bomb was a conscious choice made after considering (and ultimately rejecting) alternative paths, rather than an inevitable result of a "logic of its own."
EXTENSION QUESTIONS
SUMMARY
1. Were the atomic bombs primarily the first salvos of the Cold War rather than a way to end the war with Japan?
Gar Alperovitz strongly supports the claim that the atomic bombings were shaped more by emerging Cold War politics than by military necessity. He argues that Japan was already close to surrender and that U.S. military leaders believed an invasion or bomb use might not be necessary. Instead, Alperovitz emphasizes that American leaders were also motivated by diplomatic strategy—specifically, limiting Soviet influence in Asia and demonstrating power before the USSR entered the war against Japan.
Martin Sherwin, while not denying political factors, presents a more complex interpretation. He suggests that U.S. decision-makers were influenced by both the desire to end the war quickly and the internal momentum of the Manhattan Project. In his view, the bomb became part of a “logic of its own,” making its use seem like the most decisive and total solution to ending the war.
Overall judgment: The claim is partially valid. Cold War considerations likely influenced timing and diplomacy, but most evidence suggests that ending the war quickly and avoiding invasion remained a central justification.
2. What each historian says about U.S. thinking and the primary reason for using the bomb?
Gar Alperovitz:
Martin Sherwin:
3. Conclusions about political/moral justifications and whether the bombs could have been avoided.
Political justifications
Gar Alperovitz-A view of the atomic bomb as aimed at Russia rather than Japan
Sherwin-A view of the atomic bomb as primarily aimed at Japan
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
a) Briefly explain ONE major difference between Alperovitz and Sherwin’s historical interpretation of the dropping of the atomic bombs.
A major difference lies in the intent behind the decision. Alperovitz interprets the use of the bomb as a calculated political move aimed at the Soviet Union, arguing that it was a "combat demonstration" intended to force the Russians to accept American terms for peace rather than a decision based on military necessity. Sherwin, however, views the decision as being driven by internal momentum and "unquestioned assumptions." He argues that the secret development of the weapon created a "logic of its own," making the bomb appear as a "total solution" that policymakers felt compelled to use because they were trapped by the project's own trajectory.
b) Briefly explain how ONE development from 1941 to 1945 not directly mentioned in the excerpts challenges Alperovitz’s argument.
The extremely high casualty rates during the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa in 1945 challenge Alperovitz’s argument that military considerations were not the overriding factor. The fierce resistance shown by Japanese forces in these battles led many American military planners to believe that a land invasion of Japan would result in a massive loss of American lives. This suggests that the decision to use the bomb was deeply rooted in the military necessity of ending the war quickly to avoid an even bloodier invasion, rather than being primarily a diplomatic tool against Russia.
c) Briefly explain how ONE development from 1941 to 1945 not directly mentioned in the excerpt's challenges Sherwin’s argument.
Sherwin’s claim that policymakers were "trapped" by "unquestioned assumptions" is challenged by the deliberations of the Interim Committee and the Franck Report. In June 1945, scientists involved in the Manhattan Project issued the Franck Report, which specifically argued against using the bomb on a city and instead suggested a technical demonstration. The fact that these alternatives were formally proposed and discussed by high-level officials indicates that assumptions were indeed questioned and that the decision to drop the bomb was a conscious choice made after considering (and ultimately rejecting) alternative paths, rather than an inevitable result of a "logic of its own."
EXTENSION QUESTIONS
- Assess the validity of the claim that the dropping of the bombs on Japan was not so much an attempt to end the war against the Japanese, as it was "the first salvos in the emerging Cold War."
- What does each of these historians see as American officials' thinking about the relationship between the bomb and the ending of the war against Japan? What does each regard as the primary reason for the use of the bomb?
- What conclusions might be drawn from each of these views about the political and moral justifications for dropping the bomb? Could the use of the atomic bombs have been avoided?
SUMMARY
1. Were the atomic bombs primarily the first salvos of the Cold War rather than a way to end the war with Japan?
Gar Alperovitz strongly supports the claim that the atomic bombings were shaped more by emerging Cold War politics than by military necessity. He argues that Japan was already close to surrender and that U.S. military leaders believed an invasion or bomb use might not be necessary. Instead, Alperovitz emphasizes that American leaders were also motivated by diplomatic strategy—specifically, limiting Soviet influence in Asia and demonstrating power before the USSR entered the war against Japan.
Martin Sherwin, while not denying political factors, presents a more complex interpretation. He suggests that U.S. decision-makers were influenced by both the desire to end the war quickly and the internal momentum of the Manhattan Project. In his view, the bomb became part of a “logic of its own,” making its use seem like the most decisive and total solution to ending the war.
Overall judgment: The claim is partially valid. Cold War considerations likely influenced timing and diplomacy, but most evidence suggests that ending the war quickly and avoiding invasion remained a central justification.
2. What each historian says about U.S. thinking and the primary reason for using the bomb?
Gar Alperovitz:
- U.S. officials believed Japan could likely surrender without invasion or atomic bomb use.
- Military leaders allegedly advised that unconditional surrender was already achievable.
- The key motivation was political: to limit Soviet expansion and shape postwar balance in Asia.
- Primary reason for using the bomb: Cold War positioning against the Soviet Union, not strictly military necessity.
Martin Sherwin:
- Policymakers were operating under uncertainty at the end of a total war.
- The development of the bomb created a “logic of its own,” pushing leaders toward its use.
- Officials believed it offered a way to end the war quickly and decisively.
- Primary reason for use: ending the war in the fastest, most total way possible under wartime pressures, rather than primarily Cold War strategy.
3. Conclusions about political/moral justifications and whether the bombs could have been avoided.
Political justifications
- From Alperovitz’s perspective, the decision is politically questionable because it suggests the U.S. may have used the bomb to intimidate the USSR, making it an early Cold War action rather than a purely wartime necessity.
- From Sherwin’s perspective, the decision reflects wartime logic—leaders felt compelled to use a weapon that promised decisive victory, even if alternatives existed.
- Alperovitz’s view raises stronger moral criticism: if Japan was near surrender and diplomacy with the USSR was a factor, then civilian destruction becomes harder to justify.
- Sherwin’s view frames the moral issue as more tragic than intentional—leaders were trapped by technological and strategic momentum.
- According to Alperovitz: Yes, Japan might have surrendered through diplomacy, blockade, or Soviet entry without atomic bombing.
- According to Sherwin: Possibly, but uncertain—leaders believed alternatives were risky, slower, and less decisive, and the “logic of total war” made avoidance unlikely.
Gar Alperovitz-A view of the atomic bomb as aimed at Russia rather than Japan
Sherwin-A view of the atomic bomb as primarily aimed at Japan